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**Political Crisis in Germany and Collapse
of Weimar Republic
(1930-1933)**

Major 07.00.03. - World History

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Doctor's Degree in History**

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31

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32

URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM: A political crisis has always been the object
of study in social sciences. This is natural as much as analyzing this problem, its
causes and the ways to overcome them is a supporting condition to evade or to
solve similar cataclysms.

In its long history of development the mankind has tried to ensure a better
future by evolutionary or most often by revolutionary means; as a result they
reformed existing political systems or change the old systems with new ones. Finally,
from the beginning of XX century a new state with liberal-democratic values began
to appear.

This process hastened after World War the First, after Russian, Turkish, Austrian-
Hungarian and German empires ceased their existence. This fact created illusions
as if nothing would democratization of Europe. Classical example of crashing
democratic structure and changing it with dictatorship was given to the world by
Germany. When Nazis came into power, it changed the fate not only of his country
but of other peoples of Europe and led the mankind to the World War the Second.

Therefore, it is clear that the thematic of the essay, which is devoted to the
important historical turn-round in Germany at the beginning of the XX century,
will always be actual, despite many works of different scientists from various
states. One more attempt to find out something new about this historical event will
help us to understand the problem more thoroughly.

SUBJECT, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH: it is
impossible to find out the reasons of the crash of the republic without studying
inner political, economical and social situation of Germany. As the research
encompasses the period from March 1930 till January 30, 1933. We tried to study
the existing situation in three directions as much completely as possible. In this
period political tension reached its climax due to economic crisis. During three
years of democratic regime, government and other social, financial or political
groups made actions which resulted in complete distraction of Weimar Republic
without any appeals.

In order to reach our goals we consider it important to solve the following
problems: finding out general reasons of forming "formal democracy" in Germany;
presenting and explaining so called "super partial policies" of governmental bodies;
analyzing the favoring factors of disintegrating political system on the examples
of Bruning, Papen and Shlikher's governmental activities; presenting the roles of

formal and informal groups- Reichsver's, Junkrob's, officials', big farmers and military- industrial complexes in relation with republic; analyzing the reasons of "automation" of Weimar's partial-political system and moving to certain republican authorization; finding out the ensuring factors of totalitarian political organizations' success; studying the process of financial system's unification and "imperial reforms" and ascertaining its goals.

Solving these scientific problems and analyzing Bruning, Popen and Shleicher's governmental home policies enables us to have a clear view of republican crash and the reason of Nazi's coming into government.

SCIENTIFIC NOVELTY OF THE REASERCH: Georgian historical science has not been interested in this new period in German history yet. Unfortunately, the information given in high school materials is clearly old-fashioned and methodologically invalid. By scientific analysis of the set goals, we tried to fill this gap. On the group of a number of sources and scientific literature published in German Federal Republic we studied the process of Weimar political system's disintegration 1930-1933 in many respects, found out the reasons of moving to authoritarian regime and its favoring factors. As this scientific problem is rather difficult we consider the dissertation as the first and very modest attempt of bringing this thematic in Georgian scientific literature.

PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH: Research has a theoretical and practical significance. It will be very useful and helpful for the specialist and students of the world history and international relations. Also this research helps professors to create new courses and syllabuses in the world history.

METHODOLOGY: In order to reach the set goals, we used the methods of historical comparative analysis, working up statistical information, critical survey of different sources and literature etc. The main was universal historical principle: to see and analyze the problem in its historical-chronological dynamics.

APPROBATION OF RESEARCH: Dissertations was creating at the scientific center of International Relations Institute of Akaki Tsereteli State University. Approbation was carrying out on the dissertation board faculty of Social Science (ATSU) in 2010 protocol № . Reviewer presented by the experts David Gogetchikori full professors departments of world history and politology and Vasil Fomilze associated professors departments of world history and politology.

STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH: Research consist the following chapters: preface, 3 chapter, conclusion, enclosure, bibliography. Dissertation thesis contains 239 pages.

HISTORIOGRAPHY: during working on the dissertation materials published in Germany were of great use. The sources used in the thesis may be divided into 5 groups: 1. Acts of Chancellery of Reich; 2. Stenographic writings of Reich's sittings; 3. Juridical documents; 4. the annual report books of Empire's statistical bodies; 5. Memoirs of political people and epistolary works.

In 1964 historical commission f Bavarian Academy of Sciences (with the head K.D. Erdman) and German Federal archive (H. Booms) began executing joint project in order to collect the materials about modern history of disseminated Germany after World War 2nd. Famous historians- Hagen Schulze, Anton Goleki, Martin Fogt, Peter Wolf, Ingrid Schulze-Bidlingsmeier, Karl Heinz Harburk, Karl Ditrich Erdman, Ginter Abromovski, Karl Heinz Minut and Thillman Kops took part in this activity. The project was successfully fulfilled, which resulted in publishing collections of chronologically ordered governmental acts and the documents of other types. We should say in advance that these publications will be of great value to scholars interested in this period of German history in the future as well. In 1982 participants of the above mentioned project published a collection of documents with the name- "Acts of Reich Chancellery. 1st and 2nd cabinets of Bruning. Vol. I-II"(in the first volume there are 252 documents and in the second-262). It was technically edited and commented by Tilman Koops. The preface says that due to technical problems and other reasons, materials about the period of October 10, 1931 till may 30, 1932 could not be included in thos publication. This shortcoming was corrected in 1990, when a third volume of this publication was issued (comprising 260 documents)

In 1986 the same group published "Acts of Reich Chancellery. Cabinet of Won Schleicher" (in sum 79 documents) edited by Anton Goleki, and in 1989-"Acts of Reich Chancellery. Wan Papen's cabinet. Vol. I-II"(the first volume contains 129 documents and the second-111) edited by Karl Heinz Minut.

Total volume of these publications is 4498 pages and they include 1093 documents. They comprise materials kept in the archives of financial, economics, foreign and home affairs, imperial council of economics, army, Munich modern historical institute and social - democratic parties of Bad-Godesberg. It also uses

memoirs of Arnold Brecht, Eduard Dingeldey, Otto Geßler, Josef Gubells, Alfred Hugenberg, C. Zevering, Henrich Brüning and Franz Wan Papen as well as funds of Koblenz's collection of manuscripts, materials of Prussian State Secret Archive and Prussian Ministry of Jurisdiction.

This collection of documents comprises government sessions' minutes held during March 30, 1930 and January 30, 1933 in Reich Chancellery, texts of negotiations between chancellors (Brüning, Papen, Schleicher) ministers and representatives of Reichstag's Fraction; description of discussions with the president of Reich; documents about separate aspects of financial, home and foreign policy; speeches of chancellors, federal ministers and other administrative officials; accounts of visits to foreign countries; letters sent by federals to the central government, etc.

We may see from this general description that if we work out these publications completely, it will enable us to analyze and appreciate activities of German government during 1930-1933, elucidating positive and negative parts of governmental activities aiming at solving economic and political crisis. Compilers' professional comments add value to these publications; some documents were appreciated by famous representatives of German neo-liberal historical school.

In the work we used Reichstag's stenographic writings of Weimar republic's 4th (session 70), 5th (session 55), 6th (session 2) and 7th (session 3) sittings, which are over 6100 pages in size. They contain texts of speeches of different representatives of the party fractions, which came into the legislative body of the government. By studying these materials we have a clear view of Germany's partial-political tactics and strategy. Parliamentary speeches of Torgler, Schtrasser, Soloman, Tsetkin, Kaas, Leicht, Dingelday, Pieck, Guring and members of the cabinet of Ministers are very interesting as well. They enable us to explain and analyze parliamentary tactics of German political forces.

Since April 1930, after President Hindenburg established the practice of governing the state with special decrees, Reichstag lost both legislative and controlling power guaranteed by constitution. That is why, studying juridical aspects of the laws adopted in this period, elucidates the essence of current political process in the country. Henceforth, "Imperial laws" published in 1931-1933 are none the less interesting.

According to the rule established in Germany since XIX century, juridical

document would come into force only after its publishing. With this purpose Home Ministry of Empire permanent published "Collections of Laws"; after grouping them by their content they were brought into 1st (home policy) or 2nd (foreign policy) volume of "Imperial Laws" at the end of each year. This tradition was preserved during Weimar Republic too. The work uses the three volumes of "Imperial Laws" published in 1931, 1932 and 1933. These publications are of more interest because they contain texts of 115 special decrees published during Brüning's and Papen's Chancellorship, which are added by their juridical explanations. Total volume of these publications is over 1400 pages.

An important source social-economic history of Germany during 1930-1933, is "Statistical Annuals of German Reich" published statistical body of the Empire. They contain precious data about the urbanization of the country, agriculture, different fields of industry, financial system, results of the elections, etc. A great deal of the essay's content is based on these publications.

Clearly, the above mentioned collections of documents are official state publications. From the very 50ies of the XIX century German historiography tried to search for the documents, which depicted activities of political organizations working in non-governmental sector and social groups and Reichswehr's position. We should say that they reached their goal and from 1959 thick collections of documents appeared: "Reasons and Results: 1918 to 1945 collapse to formation of modern German State", edited by Herbert Michaelis and Ernest Schrepler. Coming from the thematic of the above mentioned work, the author needed to use its eighth volume. Unfortunately, it turned out to be out of reach by that moment, but by comments on Reich Chancellery's acts, we already had an idea about those sources.

This shortcoming was partially improved by using collections of documents published by editors Wolfgang Michalka and Golfrid Nidhardt - "Not-lovable Republic. Documents about Weimar's home and foreign policy". It was published in 1981 in Munich and its total size 447 pages. Because of the thematic of our work, we are especially interested in K. Schtjalpnagel's memorandum, extracts from I Gubels' diaries, Hitler's speech in Diuselndorf's club, data about politician's positions after 1932 presidential and parliamentary elections, writings between Papen and Hitler, description of Catholic Center's leader L. Kaas' visit to Hinderburg (November 1932) etc.

From memoirs used in the work we should pay a special attention to H. Brüning's "Memoirs". It should be noted that specialists interested in German history were waiting to this publication from the start. This expectance became more tense when in the mid of 50ies ex-chancellor signed a contract of 10 000 marks amount with one of the publishing -houses in Stuttgart, by which he took it as his duty to publish his memoirs in near future. Despite this, Brüning deliberately postponed its publication for the reason that in 50-ies the contents of memoirs would form German authority and foreign affairs. Finally, this problem was solved according to the chancellor's will and his memoirs were published soon after his death in 1970.

This is a 720 paged work which is clearly distinguished with a high academic level of the author and scientifically equipped: besides notes and comments, the text also contains diagrams describing situation in separate branches of economics in 1930-1933. In fact, this a scientific work, whose author, on the basis of a number of factual information, tries to persuade the reader that the course led by him at the beginning of the 30ies had no alternative.

It should be emphasized that truthfulness of the facts mentioned in ex-chancellor's memoirs are proved by other sources as well. By describing everyday events he tries to present what conditioned establishing authoritarian regime in Germany. He still remains loyal to state hegemony and by presenting negative positions of the parties he attempts to justify authoritarian rule.

While Describing the Cabinet activities, Brüning tries to pay attention especially on actions to denounce Vassal's Cabinet Treaty. He emphasizes that German home policy really demanded restriction of parliamentarism. It is clear in the memoirs that his attitude towards pluralism and democracy is negative. We see the Chancellor in the role of a monarch unknown before. Till nowadays many German historians look with doubt at Brüning's memoirs as truthful historical source, though there is also a large group for which this is not a problem.

From the point of view of tactics and strategy of social-democratic party, activities of Prussian Government, coup d'etat of July 30, 1932, finding out nuances of relationship with the Empirical Cabinet and generally, to describe and appreciate inner political state of Germany, memoirs of O. Braun and K. Zevering are very interesting, but we cannot say the same about Franz Wan Papen's memoirs, because it is doubtfully an attempt to falsify history.

Crisis and collapse of Weimar Republic became the object of study of German scientists since 50-ies of the 2nd Republic. This process was stimulated by setting up Modern Institute of Munich (1950) and by establishing "Commission for Studying Parliamentarism and Political Parties" (1951). Their interest was very practical: to avoid similar facts in the future. In 1954 Verner Konze published an article "Crisis of the State Party in Germany in 1929-1930" in the journal "Historische Zeitschrift", where he expressed his view that depriving Reichstag of legislative initiative and establishing presidential regime was inevitable. This publication, which aimed at justifying Chancellor Brüning's activities, provoked a wide range of ideas, that became an object of study for further researches.

The first result of the disagreement was K. D. Bracher's work published in 1955 "The End of Weimar Republic. On the problem of losing power and democracy", which became the bestseller. It was the first thick-covered book in neo-liberals group, which brought a new methodological step in historical science and we may say that it gave a wide way to future scholars.

In difference with W. Konze, K.D. Bracher blamed Brüning in occupying the Government, and deemed that the reasons for the Democratic System's failure were losing power of governing elite at the first stage, and then-government vacuum: "Political groups were under the pressure of government vacuum, which excluded democratic mechanism partly by force and partly automatically... Hitler's coming was favored by Hindenburg's hesitation and Nazis' devoted activities, Schleicher's unproven optimism and Papen's evil ambition" says K.D. Bracher.

"Commission to study Parliamentarism and Political Parties" was very active in its turn. In 1960 they completed a nine-year research of Weimar's leading political organizations and published a collection "The End of Parties 1933". With the editors E. Mathias and R. Morsey. Despite a 50-year interval, its scientific value is so great that it is still very interesting to scientists interested in the history of Weimar's Party-political specter.

In the collection there are gathered and analyzed a number of factual materials about the main political organizations in Weimar Republic. Compilers pay a special attention to parties' ideology and the tactics of their leaders activities during 1918-1933. They express an interesting opinion about destruction of "Weimar's Great Coalition", impossibility of consolidating Liberals and reasons of inefficiency of the State Party established in 1930. They also completely describe the factors that

conditioned re-grouping of Catholic Centre's Party and transmitting it into right-wing camp.

From the end of 50ies German Historiography began to study the reasons of contradiction between parties and central government in Weimar Republic. From this point we should regard Valdemar Beson as a pioneer. In 1954 he published a work "Württemberg and State Crisis in Germany in 1928-1933. A research on the Weimer Republic Collapse".

From the factors that conditioned dissatification of regional administration by federal government, the author mainly singles out financial-economic and customs problems. W. Besson, based on relevant resources, shows the negative attitude of Württemberg government towards financial unification executed by Brüning and Papen in 1930-1932 and Imperial reform projects. He is one of the first researchers, who brought in constitutional problems into the reasons that conditioned the crash of the Republic.

A book published by a representative of old generation of liberals. Theodor Eschenburg in 1963 "Improvised Democracy: a historical book about Weimar Republic" is also very interesting. He was the witness of the Republic's failure and personally knew many political figures acting in Germany during 30ies. Among the reasons of Weimar Republic's crash. Th. Eschenburg names social-cultural factor of German nation too. he believed that the country was not ready for democratic development, because a large part of its population was still monarchial. Negative home and foreign political process that took place in 1919-1930, made this tendency more tense. Because of this fact, "Weimer's Republic with its liberal phraseology was perceived as a political system inspired by foes", the failure of which was not resisted by the nation.

Studying separable aspects of the first German Democracy's failure was taken to a high level by Eberhard Kolb. His famous work "Weimar Republic" was published in 1962. In the third chapter - "Disintegrating the Republic dairy 1930-1933" - he deals with interesting problems. He minutely reviews the factors that conditioned totalitarian forces' success, the character of the last government's activities, the influence of international cooperated societies' altitude on inner political processes that were taking place in Germany, he analyses the reasons of turning to presidential governance and in difference with K. D. Bracher, he emphasizes that changing constitutional reality conditioned not "losing power"

for governing group, but charging it with presidential apparatus.

In researching Weimar Republic Professor of Tübingen University Gerhard Schulz contributed much. Among his numerous publications, which tell us about a wide range of activities of the scholar, we could like to single out his famous trilogy - "Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Constitutional policy and Imperial Reform in Weimar Republic," vol. I-III. The third volume was of special interest for us - "From Weimar towards Hitler. Changes in German Political System in 1930-1933-ies." Its volume is 1051 pages. The author discusses constitutional and imperial reforms on the basis of Brüning, Papen and Schleicher's cabinets activities. It completely presents the measures taken by Reich's President and Cabinet of Ministers with the aim of appropriation of legislative initiative. The author points with an emphasis that the true essence of German political crisis was of constitutional character.

Like G. Schulz, very interesting positions are given in widely known books of neoliberal researcher Heinrich August Winkler - "A Way to Catastrophe. Workers and Workers' movements in Germany in 1930-1933-ies" and "Weimar 1918-1933. History of the first German Democracy." These books were interesting for us from the point of view of explaining the so-called "policy of patience" of social-democratic party, because the literature that existed among us, didn't give us an opportunity to have an objective view about this problem. By giving appropriate argumentations, the author truly manages to explain the reasons of this Marxist organization's "tolerance" towards Brüning's cabinet. Besides, he convincingly analyses impossibility of forming the so-called anti-Nazi "United Front," in which social-democrats were one-sidedly blamed by Soviet historiography during the period of 70-ies.

From the 70-ies XX century in German historiography a new direction was formed, which studied problems of Weimar Republic's dismantling from social-economic angle. From this point of view very interesting options are expressed by Knut Borchard and Ursula Büttner's works.

In studying the history of active organizations in Germany in 1918-1933, industrial and agrarian groups, and professional alliances much work was done by D. Frike, M. Geier, K. Hols, E. Ionass, P. Lusche, H. Momsen, D. Pezina, R. Morsey, R. Neebe, L. Preller, U. Schelm-Spangenberg, H. I. Schor, K. Schunhoven, V. R. Berghahn and others, the relationships between federal parts of the Republic and

Central Governments are presented in the works of W. Benz, H. Grund, H. Müller, W. Runge, H. Schulze and W. Stefan. In the work we have also used researches devoted to separate historical persons by L.A. Bendin, E. Deuerlein, H. Dieckmann, A. Dorpalen, M. Schumacher, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and A. Bullok.

During the contradiction between two political systems and the existence of Soviet Union, different aspects of the first German Democracy's crash were depicted by both Soviet Scientific Centres and Marxist Historiography of GDR. Despite the abundance of works, which are written by L. I. Ginzberg, I. Kornev, A. Norden, W. Ruge, B. G. Baev, V. N. Vinogradov, M. E. Erin, V. D. Kulbakin, I. S. Drabkin, V. G. Tartakovskii, M. I. Orlova, L. V. Ovchinnikova, A. I. Patrushev and others, methodologically they are very poor and clearly ideological.

THE MAIN CONTENT OF THE THESIS:

INTRODUCTION: the urgency of the thesis is substantiated and the chronological frames are defined. Goals and objectives of the thesis are formulated and scientific novelty is visible. It presents substantial description of historiography and contains deep analysis of contemporary level in German and Russian historiography related to problem study in the part of scientific research.

CHAPTER ONE contains information regarding "Economic and Social-Political situation in Germany at the beginning of 30s" and consists from three paragraphs. This chapter examines the influence of the world economic crisis on social-economic and political environment in Germany, which started in 1928. The factors determining the organization of Weimer political system is presented together with characterization of the conditions for party-political spectrum in the country and their aspirations at the very end of the republic's existence. The focus is made on the reasons, which inspired the collapse of "Big Weimer Coalition" and terms promoting the increasing influence of the bodies with totalitarian orientation are defined. It is mentioned that internal political situation of Germany was tense and very difficult by the beginning of 30s. In terms of dispersion within party-political spectrum it was impossible to avoid governmental crisis. Reactionary bodies who were present in big numbers in Weimer political or in some other unions found the existing situation very profitable for the realization of their goals.

It was obvious that crucial moment was coming, when these bodies had to solve the problem and choose between authoritarian presidential administration, monarchy or one-party dictatorship? The lack of constructive bodies and domination of destructive tendencies aiming at dismantling the republic decreased the chances to preserve it day by day. The resignation of H. Müller on March 27, 1930 and exclusion of social-democrats from the future cabinets of ministry minimized these chances. Now it was necessary to choose the proper moment in order to realize anti-republic turn over on the basis of defending formally the principle of legality.

CHAPTER TWO „Bruning's cabinet and political struggle around the anti-recessionary problems" consists of four units. **The first unit** depicts the reasons which led Bruning to the power and which transmitted the country to the presidential government. Unlike other well developed European countries Germany did not have a strong political system based on parliamentarism or pluralism. It is natural, as this state had not experienced civil revolutions inspiring systemic changes. That is why the existence of a legislative authority, being a foundation stone in the political and cultural life of Germany in times of Kaiser, was marked in the minds of representatives of each social class. Even liberal values declared in the 1919 Imperial constitution could not vanish these marks as the main rule of the democratic state itself was of dual nature, thus representing a bridge between old and modern political systems. According to law the Republic of Weimar represented an incomplete democratic state. It was founded after the lost war, as a compromise among civil, catholic and social-democratic groups. That is why it was not accepted by the absolute majority of the society. As a result of all above mentioned, economical crises begun in 1929 led people to the idea of Bismarck's state.

Weimar constitution could not manage to share the social parts between "the Empire enemies and its friends". The country where this division is not wisely made usually runs a risk of civil disagreement.

In times of economical crises this inspired executive authority for separation. The idea of a minister cabinet free from political interests was becoming more and more popular.

The activity by the groups concerned about this question was based on the article 48 of the Constitution, and thus prevented pro-republic forces. It is obvious that they were aware of it themselves. The fare of using constitution in order to establish dictatorship as a result of unstable parliamentary majority and weak

coalition was evident since 1919. This fare doubled after Feldmarshal Hindenburg came in the head of the Republic and Raichswehr's political activities increased. After this the President and his followers regarded social-democrats as unreliable force. Thus even in case of the fare of Nazism and economical crises it was evident that the authority would make its choice in favor of authoritarianism.

It will not be correct if we charge Raichspräsident, his followers, right-wing politicians or even Reichswehr with reorganizing political system. The greatest problem was weakness of democratic institutions. Because of economical, political and social changes the power division was so uncertain that the Imperial Government changed 16 times in 1919-1933 years. Neither democratic, nor liberal right-wing forces could not interfere in this process, thus encouraging their voters to supporter electorate. All these led people to deadlock, and which seemed nearly impossible to escape.

As a result of negative results following the crises, representatives of each social class were against Weimar: manufacturers were not content with the work of the unions, nobles-with abolishing social privileges, middle class-with inflation, left-wing intelligence-with the compromising Republic, others-with instability etc.

Thus the fact that parliamentary democracy was rejected was not inspired by a definite political force but by the entire German society. The crises in the Government, interminable parliamentary disputes, interfraction disagreements decreased the idea of parliamentarism in Germany. They thought that "the Partial state" was broke, that in case of crises presidential system was more acceptable as it could get over economical and political problems.

One part of Bourgeoisie parties manufacturers, Raichswehr, Hindenburg and their followers could foreseen the feelings of the society. In 1930 they withdrew social-democrats and thus assisted to form a new authoritarian government.

The second and third units shows the analysis of the disintegration of political system and the reasons and aims of constitutional reforms. There is defined the essence of "the super partial politics", the factors of disagreement between Federal Government and Military Authority." The super partial politics" carried out by Brüning went in the deadlock from the beginning. The process of disintegration made legislative bodies and other components of political system (federation subjects, parties, unions etc.) lose old functions in the new reality, that meant that one of the issues of the Cancellor's political supporters' demand was fulfilled.

That is why influence of the latter on current affairs increased, what made the basement of Republic collapse even more.

In fact, in summer 1931 Germany was facing a new political reality, but on the one hand, the disagreement in the ruling authorities and on the other hand, the fair of international community of possible reaction prevented this reality. In case of economical crises it seemed impossible to keep such half-democratic half-authoritarian political situation. That is why, in order to maintain strategic advantages, the Government tried to solve foreign problems, thus directing people's attention from ultra radicals to positive solution of foreign policy.

This was the main objectives of Cancellor Brüning's work. Which required a lot of efforts, united political team and the ability to escape from crises. According to author Brüning made the biggest mistake at the very beginning of this work when he did not try to strengthen his power. Thus he turned out to be not only "a commander-in chief without soldiers" but also he was trapped in the current affairs. His inner policy was marked with reflexive reaction rather than consistent steps of complex policy. Which finally ruined his image of a effective anti-crises manager. This tendency is to be emphasized in his two-year canceller period.

The fourth unite gives details of Brüning's internal and foreign policy (an attempt to make a "customs union" with Austria, attempts to tackle bank crises, relation with political parties etc.). It also gives reasons why political situation escalated and why Brüning's first Cabinet was reorganized. It concludes the Government was responsible for Reichstag's complete isolation, as well as for incredible increase of the President and the Executive Government's functions as a result of disintegrated political system, also for making first steps to abolish reparations, for creating fundaments of financial and imperial reforms, for preventing right-wing political parties from attracting other parties, for the failure of Austria-Germany customs union, hardened economical, financial, social and political situation, for making people extremely hard-up, to assist in increase of ultra-radicals' power, for maintaining an image of unstable state in international communion and keeping social-democratic center in Prussia. Thus leaving Brüning in the post of canceller meant that his second cabinet had to correct the mistakes made by the previous one.

Unit fifth and six shows the role of Reichswehr and financial groups in the current political affairs in Germany in 1932. It analyses reasons making the

legislative body ineffective, Brüning's social and economical efforts to get over the crises. It shows the factor of a person in Germany of that time and defines reasons for Brüning's failure.

Based on wide range of historical sources, the author concludes that the retirement of the Cancellor put an end to liberal presidency in Germany. Brüning managed to level out German budget, prepared imperial reforms, tackled huge bank crises, according to his own words, Germany was in 100 meters distance from its sacred dream to abolish reparations and restore military equality.

The fact that the Cancellor focused on foreign policy and economical problems led him to financial sanation. This weakened social insurance system, increased the number of unemployment, and harmed agricultural sector. Brüning made the economical regulation state system and differentiated rates work which caused disagreement between tycoons and the Cabinet.

As a result of the Cancellor's inner policy the political system was disintegrated which made Germany face a new constitutional reality. He was unable to regulate radical-political movements. His anti-crises management in times of deep economical depression somehow favored ultra radicals and doubled their supporters' number. This was a destructive nature of Brüning's inner policy.

CHAPTER THREE "Weimar republic during the Papen's and Schleicher's antirepublic cabinets" is divided into two units. **The first unit** is dedicated to coup d'état in Prussia on July 20, 1932. It gives details how it was prepared and carried out. It shows reactionary nature of Baron P. Papen's "cabinet of Barons" as well as reasons which led to disagreement with federation subjects. It estimates the failure of social-democrats in Prussia. It says that Papen managed to gain power as a result of rivals' weak policy. We should respect Prussian politicians' opinions. There position in current situation of June-July 1932 was correct, but this meant nothing for the history. Apart from the political importance the coup d'état on July 20, 1932 also had great psychological effect: it discouraged one part of society and besides made them think that other anti-republic measures would be followed by the same kind of weak reaction. Many German scientists consider July 20, 1932 as the end of Weimar political system.

The second unit shows social political aspects of K. Von Schleicher's cabinet. The author denotes that General's inconsistent policy carried out against the Nazis and some other political organizations during Brüning and Papen's Cancellor period

was even more severe when he got into power. All these factors finally led Hitler to the supreme power.

Conclusion: according to the materials depicted in the work we consider that the failure of the first German Republic were:

1. In November 1918 by establishing liberal-democracy Germany was declared to become what was fought against by the Second Empire in 1914-1918 years. It was marked by history's anachronistic nature, as in case when authoritarian form was changed to pluralism and parliamentarism German political culture remained devoted to "feudatory culture". This was mainly because the formation of republic was not preceded by a traditional revolution, what would be so important to form a civil society. Values from Bismarck times were so wide spread in Germany that most people could not see the favors of democracy. Thus the Republic in 1918-1933 years had merely "formal nature". This factor was even depicted in the Constitution of the country. New German state was still called the Empire.

2. In the constitution which was based on the mixture of American and European ones was inserted a famous Article 48, the latter could be used in favor of existing system (e.g. period of President Ebert) as well as against it (e.g. period of President Hindenburg). In case of pro-authoritarian tendency the above mentioned included fear of escalating into great hazard. We would like to state that interested forces could find measures to put an end to democratic system even within its margins as it happened in case of Hindenburg in 1930-1933. So young democracy of Weimar was not protected even by constitution.

3. Variety of partite and political aspects, disagreement in forming majority in the Parliament was a reason of frequent government crises. On the one hand, it doubled the desire of the executive authority to gain legislative initiative (as it took place in 1930-1933), on the other hand, it made people look forward to "powerful leader". German propagandist machine provided President Hindenburg with such image and thus prepared common people's idea for transmitting to authoritarianism. The policy of the Government in the early 30s was nothing but authoritarianism, which was protected by Brüning, Papen and Schleicher's governments.

4. Social-political isolation of German political organizations based on confessional, economical, social factors (e.g. social-democracy, catholic center, people's party of Bavaria, people's party of Germany etc.) did not leave any chances

for integration in democratic system. That is why; the real reason of uniting in coalitions was caused not because of desire of real cooperation, but because of subjective factors and fear of possible foreign measures. Thus it in case of extreme conditions it meant a rapid and complete disintegration. All these became evident after the economical crises in 1929 which brought every problem not solved by "Weimar Big Coalition" to the surface. The latter's reunion gave birth to the disintegration process. As a matter of fact, it was the end of democracy in Germany and the beginning of authoritarianism.

5. German political society (except pro-totalitarian forces) including social-democrats was not against Hohenzollern's dynasty, as in their opinion the latter represented the guarantee of peace and stability of the country. We consider that this very factor provided peaceful transmission to authoritarianism, as political organizations returned to historically approved condition: right-wing parties (except NSDAP) united under the government, social-democrats came back to the doctrine of "patience and tolerance". In fact, on March 30, 1930 process of reanimation of political system of Imperial times. So the fact that the parliamentary democracy was rejected in the early 30s was not inspired by any definite social groups, we can state that it was a result of entire German society's readiness.

6. Formation of new political reality gave old political authority illusion of restoring their privileges (first of all, it was Reichwehr, then younkers, clerks, manufacturers, big farmers etc.). This meant on the one hand, huge international hazard (possible reaction from the Antanta) and on the other hand, it excluded the chance of inner political agreement. This factor weakened the liberal cabinet of Brüning and finally social-economical crises transferred into political one.

7. One side interests of the president, his followers and Reichswehr had bad effect on the agreement between politicians and Imperial government too. Brüning tried to solve this problem during his Chancellery but in case of sever economical sanitation agreement between the union and pro-imperial manufacturers was impossible. That is why the only way to govern the country in order to reach foreign and inner political objectives was to follow the practice of definite decrees. This led to functional changes and formation of "half-parliamentary" regime. Neither Brüning, nor Papen, nor Schleicher's governments were able to solve the problem.

8. In the period of economical crises the process of system transformation was which increased influence of pro-totalitarianism political parties. Social demagogy

of Nazis and Communists in times of economical problems found great approval among people. The destructive policy carried out by them since September 14, 1930 effected not only their efficiency but also entire political system. Blocking Reichstag and leading political processes into streets left authority unarmed in the state of a statist.

9. Brüning's project of united financial system and Imperial reforms, which though was rejected by the federation subjects (Bavaria, Baden, Vsrtemberg) was still carried out and which had an aim not only to solve economical crises, but to confirm new constitutional reality too. Though Brüning was unable to complete this project, Papen could finish it in a very rude manner. On July 20, 1932. By liquidating social-democratic government he put an end to duality between the Empire and Prussia. Subjective verdict by the Imperial Court made legislative crises evident too.

10. Papen's reactionary "Cabinet of Barons" was left without liberal bourgeois support. Besides, it managed to direct traditionally liberal catholic center party to Nazis which finally ended not only with Papen's but the whole Empire's failure.

11. Although, the last government of Wan Schleicher tried to find support in public by social slogans and thus protect the country from Nazis. But because of General's bad reputation the Unions, farmers, manufacturers did not trust him. Reichswehr's self-defense policy to separate Nazis movement failed too.

12. Nazis party used Weimer political system breaks down in its favor. Hitler managed to integrate in right-wing organization and thus made Reich president retire from his post. This was the end of the first German Republic.

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1. Devaluation and prospects of German liberalism on the last stage of republican crises, works of Kutaisi Akaki Tsereteli state University International Relations Academic-scientific Institute's scientific workers, V. 1, 2003, pg.147-154.
2. The main aspects of Brüning's first minister cabinet's internal policy(March 30, 1930-October 07,1931) Collection N 1 of young scientists' association N 1 republic conference works, Kutaisi, 2003, pg. 286-289
3. General Kurt Wan Schleicher's policy - the way to dictatorship or an attempt the Republic reanimation?!, Collection N 2 of young scientists' association N 2 republic conference works, Kutaisi, 2004, pg. 197-202
4. Coup in Prussia on July 20, 1932, magazine "Intellect" ,N3(26), Tbilisi, 2006, pg. 67-69.
5. Hitler and inner party opposition in NSDAP in 1924-1926. Bamberg party conference, magazine "Intellect" ,N1(27), Tbilisi, 2007, pg. 42-44.